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The Polish government is stepping up its repression. Or so it seems. After packing
the Constitutional Tribunal, dismissing more than 150 (out of 700) presidents
and vice-presidents of ordinary courts, raising the overall number of Supreme
Court judges, and creating new tools for cowing judges,1)On the measures, see
COM(2017)835 final, “European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in accordance
with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland:
Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious
breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law”. the Polish government now
seems ready to instrumentalize this transformed judiciary. The freedom of political
speech is a main target.
Possible evidence can be found in the proceedings against Wojciech Sadurski: For
his vocal criticism of the current Polish government,2)For his views, see W. Sadurski,
How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist
Backsliding. Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 18/01; ibid., Constitutional
Crisis in Poland, in: A. Graber, S. Levinson and M. Tushnet (eds.), Constitutional
Democracy in Crisis (OUP 2018); ibid., Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS:
From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler, Hague
Journal on the Rule of Law (2018). Sadurski, a renowned law professor at the
Universities of Sydney and Warsaw, faces a range of legal proceedings. A member
of the new Supreme Court’s disciplinary chamber has submitted a motion to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against Sadurski at the Warsaw University because he
called judges of the Supreme Court’s disciplinary chamber "losers". The Law and
Justice Party (PiS) has filed a civil lawsuit because Sadurski called it an "organized
criminal group". In addition, TVP (the Polish public television, which is controlled by
the ruling majority) has pressed for defamation charges against Sadurski relating
to his public views. Similarly, TVP filed a lawsuit against Polish Ombudsman Adam
Bodnar as a private individual following a statement about hate speech made after
the assassination of the mayor of Gdansk. Bodnar indicated that one motivation
for the assassination could have been TVP’s biased reports suggesting, inter
alia, a connection of the mayor to Nazis and Communists and his involvement in
corruption.3)For a full account, see the Ombudsman’s official website; for reactions
from the Council of Europe, see PACE, Rapporteur calls on Polish Public Television
to withdraw its suit against Ombudsman.  Finally, rumor has it that proceedings
against the former president of the Polish constitutional tribunal, Andrzej Rzepli#ski,
are also in the making. 
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In the current context, such proceedings are not an internal Polish but a European
affair, as they regard the basic order of the European Union. They squarely fall
into the situation addressed by the proposal of the European Commission for a
decision under Article 7 (1) TEU to determine “a clear risk of a serious breach” of
EU values. A safe starting point for any legal analysis is that the Polish proceedings
have to respect the freedom of expression to the extent it is enshrined in Article 2
TEU. The focus of this blog post is not to discuss whether Sadurski’s or Bodnar’s
pronouncements are protected by Article 2 TEU; for that we do not have enough
evidence. Rather, it discusses what Polish judges can and have to do under EU law,
and what possible sanctions they might face if they disrespect their duties. 
Freedom of Speech as an EU Value
Though we cannot fully qualify the aforementioned cases, it seems likely that judicial
proceedings against such critics for expressing opinions—including offensive ones
—on Polish public issues violate free speech under EU law.4)In Bodnar’s case,
he probably acted in his official capacity as Ombudsman, thus raising issues of
his powers rather than his fundamental rights. Of course, the EU Fundamental
Rights Charter protects the freedom of expression (Article 11 CFR) only within
the scope of Union law (Article 51 CFR). However, the essence of this freedom
is also protected by the values of “human rights” and “democracy” enshrined in
Art. 2 TEU. As explained by the ECtHR5)See  ECtHR, Judgement of 8 July 1986,
Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, para. 42; Judgement of 26 November 1996,
Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, para. 58; [GC] Judgement
of 22 April 2013, Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, App. No.
48876/08, paras. 102-103. and more recently by the CJEU in Tele2 Sverige, the
freedom of expression is of “particular importance … in any democratic society.”
According to the Court, it “constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist,
democratic society, and is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the
Union is founded.” This applies particularly to political speech. If a Member State
disrespects this “essential foundation”, it crosses a red line of membership.6)A. v.
Bogdandy/P. Bogdanowicz/I. Canor/M. Taborowski/M. Schmidt, Guest Editorial: A
potential constitutional moment for the European rule of law – The importance of red
lines, CML Rev 55 (2018), 983; see the debate “A Rescue Package for Fundamental
Rights” on Verfassungsblog.
Since the limits of Article 51 CFR do not apply to EU values, relying on the “essence”
of a fundamental right under Article 2 TEU  makes a great difference. To the extent
that the freedom of expression falls under Article 2 TEU, Polish citizens’ political
speech is protected under Union law against any measure of their home country
that seriously infringes this value.7)For the full argument, see A. v. Bogdandy/M.
Kottmann/C. Antpöhler/J. Dickschen/S. Hentrei/M. Smrkolj, Reverse Solange –
Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights Against EU Member States, CML
Rev 49 (2012), 489.
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Applicability and Primacy of European Values 
What does that mean for national officials involved in judicial proceedings against
critics? Poland has not yet enacted specific laws targeting critical voices. Judicial
proceedings are likely to rely on general laws, be it torts in private law (like slander),
defamation in criminal law (Article 212 of the Polish Criminal Code), or general
clauses of disciplinary law. Given the openness of such general provisions, a judge
can interpret and apply such a general provision in such a way as to sanction critical
pronouncements. Here, EU law steps in: its applicability and primacy in domestic
proceedings bars such interpretation. This flows from the general EU principle
that any domestic judge has to interpret and apply domestic law in conformity with
EU law,8)See CJEU, Judgement of 13 November 1990, Marleasing, C-106/89,
EU:C:1990:395, para. 8. which today includes its directly applicable values. Of
course, such applicability of the European values has been in doubt. In two grand
chamber decisions, the CJEU has, however, determined that the European values
are to be applied by domestic courts, in particular when they protect the essence of
a fundamental right.9)CJEU, Judgement of 27 February  2018, Associação Sindical
dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117; Judgement of 25 July 2018,
Minister of Justice and Equality, C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586. Hence, all national
law, including domestic criminal, disciplinary, and private law, must be interpreted in
light of the European values, thereby protecting political free speech.
The same logic applies to a law  explicitly permitting charges against a politically
inconvenient person. An example can be found in the Hungarian laws directed
against “enemies” like the Open Society Foundation or the Central European
University in Hungary.10)G. Halmai, Legally sophisticated authoritarians: the
Hungarian Lex CEU, Verfassungsblog (31 March 2017); R. Uitz, The Return of the
Sovereign: A Look at the Rule of Law in Hungary – and in Europe, Verfassungsblog
(5 April 2017); R. Uitz, Academic Freedom in an Illiberal Democracy: From Rule of
Law through Rule by Law to Rule by Men in Hungary, Verfassungsblog (13 October
2017); M.R. Maftean, The CEU Leaves – Hungarian Students are Left in the Lurch,
Verfassungsblog (5 December 2018); D. Kochenov/ P. Bárd, The Four Elements of
the Autocrats’ Playbook, Verfassungsblog (18 September 2018). If a domestic judge
faces such laws, he or she has to refrain from applying it to the extent it stands in
conflict with a European value. The same holds true for any official called to execute
such a judicial decision or detention measure violating this freedom.11)Generally on
the obligation of any public official to conform with EU law, see CJEU, Jugdement of
4 December 2018, Garda Síochána, C#378/17, EU:C:2018:979.
The Duty to Refer as a Shield for National Judges
Union law, by giving such directions to national judges, puts those judges in a
hard place, in particular in countries where the government’s respect for judicial
independence is low. Yet, a national judge does not stand alone but finds support in
the European union of courts. To this end, we hold that a national judge concerned
with procedures brought against critics is not only empowered but required under
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Union law to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU. This duty rests on a seminal
legal development: the protection of the European values has become as important
as the uniform application of Union law.
Generally, only courts of last instance are under a duty to make a reference when
the application of EU law in the case at hand is surrounded by uncertainties (see
Article 267(3) TFEU). According to the CJEU’s Foto-Frost decision, however, this
obligation extends to lower courts in case they doubt the validity of a provision of EU
law.12)CJEU, Judgement of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost, C-314/85, EU:C:1987:452.
Before not applying this provision, they have to refer the question of validity to the
CJEU. The underlying rationale of this extension is to preserve the effective and
uniform application of EU law (effet utile), which has been the Court’s guiding star in
the past six decades. 
Now, with Opinion 2/13, ASJP, Achmea, L.M., and Wightman, the CJEU has
complemented this functional rationale with an axiological one, implementing what
the framers state in Article 2 TEU. Today, “values” figure as prominently as “uniform
application” in its constitutional jurisprudence. Recognizing the EU as a veritable
“Union of values”, the Court forcefully protects its very foundations against the
unprecedented challenges of the illiberal turn in some Member States. In light
of this new axiological rationale, we suggest extending the logic of Foto-Frost: a
national judge has not just the right but an outright duty to refer a case whenever
the common value basis is in danger. Thus, a Polish judge faced with a case
concerning the silencing of critics, must refer the matter to the CJEU and request an
interpretation of Article 2 TEU in light of the rights at stake. 
This duty should help judges in difficult situations. They might be intimidated by
political pressure or the threat of disciplinary measures; remember the newly
established disciplinary chamber at the Supreme Court.13)Act on the (Polish)
Supreme Court of 8 December 2017, Journal of Laws (2018), item no. 5. As courts
in Lodz and Warsaw have proven, national judges can and do seek support from the
CJEU.14)See the pending preliminary references Miasto #owicz v. Skarb Pa#stwa
– Wojewoda #ódzki (C#558/18) and Prokuratura Okr#gowa w P#ocku v. VX, WW,
XV (C#563/18), which have been submitted to the expedited procedure pursuant to
Order of 1 October 2018 (ECLI:EU:C:2018:923); see further the similar reference
in case Prokuratura Rejonowa w S#ubicach (C-623/18). These Polish judges are
confronted with issues sensitive to the Polish government. They fear being subjected
to disciplinary measures should they decide against the government, and see their
judicial independence at stake. Therefore, they have asked the CJEU, based on its
findings in ASJP, whether the newly introduced disciplinary measures for ordinary
courts are in conformity with Article 19(1)(2) TEU, Article 47(1) CFR, and Article 2
TEU. 
These references present a further opportunity for the Court to show that it takes
European values seriously. We argue, therefore, that the CJEU should declare
these cases admissible and decide in support of those judges. With the help of
precautionary measures, it might even shield those judges from governmental
pressure. As the interim measures in Commission v. Poland have shown, the
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Polish government remains responsive to this basic layer of the European rule
of law.15)CJEU, Order of 19 October 2018, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18 R,
EU:C:2018:852; for more detail, see Order of 17 December 2018, Commission v.
Poland, C-619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021; see further P. Bogdanowicz/M. Taborowski,
Why the EU Commission and the Polish Supreme Court Should not Withdraw their
Cases from Luxembourg, Verfassungsblog (3 December 2018).
The Last Resort: Criminal Liability 
But what happens if the respective judge does not respect European law and
silences critics with his or her decisions? Indeed, quite a few judges owe their
position to the recent overhaul of the Polish judiciary and are considered close to the
government’s agenda. We argue that if they do not respect the primacy of Union law
and do not refer the case to the CJEU, they could face criminal liability. Why? 
Again, the primacy of EU law entails that a law may not be applied or interpreted
in a way that violates European values. If a judge hands down a decision that
violates the EU’s foundational values, she exceeds her judicial powers. Knowingly
exceeding public powers, however, is sanctioned under most legal orders. The
relevant provisions of the Polish Criminal Code describe well the various forms that
may take. For example, Art. 231(1) punishes the general excess of authority: “A
public official who, by exceeding his or her authority, or not performing his or her
duty, acts to the detriment of a public or individual interest, is liable to imprisonment
for up to three years”.16)If a critic is sent to prison, the much more severe Article
  189(1) Polish Criminal Code on illegal imprisonment might apply: “Anyone who
deprives another person of their freedom is liable to imprisonment for between three
months and five years”. If force is applied, Article 191(1) Polish Criminal Code could
come in: “Anyone who uses violence or an illegal threat to force another person to
conduct him or herself in a specified manner, or to refrain from or tolerate a certain
conduct is liable to imprisonment for up to three years.”
Certainly, the criminal liability of judges is a most delicate instrument. In order
not to infringe upon judicial independence, a careful balance has to be struck.
Therefore, the criminal liability of Polish judges can only be triggered as a last
resort; it is confined to “exceptional cases”.17)Polish Supreme Court, Judgement
of 30 August 2013, SNO 19/13. Therefore, judicial immunity must be lifted in a
special procedure.18)See Art. 181 Polish Constitution; on this see A. Bodnar/
L. Bojarski, Judicial Independence in Poland, in: A. Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial
Independence in Transition (Springer, 2012), 667, 716. Second, high standards
apply. Just recall the CJEU’s Köbler jurisprudence, which limits the action for
damages for the disrespect of Union law to a “manifest breach of the case-law of the
Court in the matter”.19)CJEU, Judgement of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C-224/01,
EU:C:2003:513, para. 56. Thirdly, any criminal prosecution of public officials in
general and judges in particular will have to show that the official knew about the
effects of Union law and intentionally set its application aside. Determining this
knowledge falls to the trial judge. But here again, actions by European institutions
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will be important: If a Polish judge knowingly disrespects a CJEU decision that
protects free speech in the case at hand, a red line and, in all likelihood, the
threshold of criminal liability are crossed. To bring about such a CJEU decision is the
responsibility of either the Polish court or the European Commission, which should
initiate infringement proceedings in a timely manner.
Furthermore, Polish criminal law protects the independence of the legal system
against those intimidating or pressuring judges. Art. 232(1) Polish Criminal Code
criminalizes anyone “who, by using violence or an illegal threat, influences the official
functions of a court of justice”. Other officials, i.e., prosecutors, are protected by
Article 224(2) Polish Criminal Code: “Anyone who uses violence or an illegal threat
with the intention of forcing a public official, or a person assisting him or her, to
undertake or abstain from legal official activity is liable to the same punishment.”
Admittedly, it seems rather unlikely that judges or politicians who silence critics will
face prosecution anytime soon. But no government lasts forever. Biased public
officials will be held accountable once the political landscape has changed. Such
criminal proceedings might also be an important tool to re-establish a judicial system
in line with the rule of law. In any event, Polish judges and Europe as a whole
must act determinedly in favor of free speech, which is essential for self-healing
through domestic democratic processes. This process of self-healing must be the
overarching aim, after all.
References
• 1. On the measures, see COM(2017)835 final, “European Commission,
Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European
Union regarding the rule of law in Poland: Proposal for a Council Decision on
the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of
the rule of law”.
• 2. For his views, see W. Sadurski, How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case
Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding. Sydney Law School Research
Paper No. 18/01; ibid., Constitutional Crisis in Poland, in: A. Graber, S. Levinson
and M. Tushnet (eds.), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis (OUP 2018); ibid.,
Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed
Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2018).
• 3. For a full account, see the Ombudsman’s official website; for reactions from
the Council of Europe, see PACE, Rapporteur calls on Polish Public Television
to withdraw its suit against Ombudsman.
• 4. In Bodnar’s case, he probably acted in his official capacity as Ombudsman,
thus raising issues of his powers rather than his fundamental rights.
• 5. See  ECtHR, Judgement of 8 July 1986, Lingens v. Austria, App. No.
9815/82, para. 42; Judgement of 26 November 1996, Wingrove v. the United
Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, para. 58; [GC] Judgement of 22 April 2013,
Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48876/08,
paras. 102-103.
• 6. A. v. Bogdandy/P. Bogdanowicz/I. Canor/M. Taborowski/M. Schmidt, Guest
Editorial: A potential constitutional moment for the European rule of law – The
- 6 -
importance of red lines, CML Rev 55 (2018), 983; see the debate “A Rescue
Package for Fundamental Rights” on Verfassungsblog.
• 7. For the full argument, see A. v. Bogdandy/M. Kottmann/C. Antpöhler/J.
Dickschen/S. Hentrei/M. Smrkolj, Reverse Solange – Protecting the Essence of
Fundamental Rights Against EU Member States, CML Rev 49 (2012), 489.
• 8. See CJEU, Judgement of 13 November 1990, Marleasing, C-106/89,
EU:C:1990:395, para. 8.
• 9. CJEU, Judgement of 27 February  2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117; Judgement of 25 July 2018, Minister of
Justice and Equality, C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586.
• 10. G. Halmai, Legally sophisticated authoritarians: the Hungarian Lex CEU,
Verfassungsblog (31 March 2017); R. Uitz, The Return of the Sovereign: A Look
at the Rule of Law in Hungary – and in Europe, Verfassungsblog (5 April 2017);
R. Uitz, Academic Freedom in an Illiberal Democracy: From Rule of Law through
Rule by Law to Rule by Men in Hungary, Verfassungsblog (13 October 2017);
M.R. Maftean, The CEU Leaves – Hungarian Students are Left in the Lurch,
Verfassungsblog (5 December 2018); D. Kochenov/ P. Bárd, The Four Elements
of the Autocrats’ Playbook, Verfassungsblog (18 September 2018).
• 11. Generally on the obligation of any public official to conform with EU law,
see CJEU, Jugdement of 4 December 2018, Garda Síochána, C#378/17,
EU:C:2018:979.
• 12. CJEU, Judgement of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost, C-314/85,
EU:C:1987:452.
• 13. Act on the (Polish) Supreme Court of 8 December 2017, Journal of Laws
(2018), item no. 5.
• 14. See the pending preliminary references Miasto #owicz v. Skarb Pa#stwa
– Wojewoda #ódzki (C#558/18) and Prokuratura Okr#gowa w P#ocku v. VX,
WW, XV (C#563/18), which have been submitted to the expedited procedure
pursuant to Order of 1 October 2018 (ECLI:EU:C:2018:923); see further the
similar reference in case Prokuratura Rejonowa w S#ubicach (C-623/18).
• 15. CJEU, Order of 19 October 2018, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18 R,
EU:C:2018:852; for more detail, see Order of 17 December 2018, Commission
v. Poland, C-619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021; see further P. Bogdanowicz/M.
Taborowski, Why the EU Commission and the Polish Supreme Court Should not
Withdraw their Cases from Luxembourg, Verfassungsblog (3 December 2018).
• 16. If a critic is sent to prison, the much more severe Article  189(1) Polish
Criminal Code on illegal imprisonment might apply: “Anyone who deprives
another person of their freedom is liable to imprisonment for between three
months and five years”. If force is applied, Article 191(1) Polish Criminal Code
could come in: “Anyone who uses violence or an illegal threat to force another
person to conduct him or herself in a specified manner, or to refrain from or
tolerate a certain conduct is liable to imprisonment for up to three years.”
• 17. Polish Supreme Court, Judgement of 30 August 2013, SNO 19/13.
• 18. See Art. 181 Polish Constitution; on this see A. Bodnar/L. Bojarski, Judicial
Independence in Poland, in: A. Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial Independence in
Transition (Springer, 2012), 667, 716.
• 19. CJEU, Judgement of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C-224/01,
EU:C:2003:513, para. 56.
- 7 -
- 8 -
